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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT REEDY,

Case No. 950638-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final order in a sentencing proceeding
for Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1995) (a copy of the order is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke
Defendant/Appellant Robert Reedy7s ("Reedy") probation where it
failed to notify Reedy of the revocation proceedings prior to
expiration of the probationary period.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The issue presents a question of law.

This Court "review[s] questions of law for correctness according
no deference to the trial court's conclusions."

State v.

Rawlinqs, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

1

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
During a probationary revocation proceeding, Reedy argued
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation
since the probationary period expired prior to the trial court
providing him with notice of the proceeding.
("R.") at 73-117.

Record on Appeal

The judge rejected Reedy's argument and

sentenced him to serve an indeterminate term of zero to five
years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 129-30, 205-06.)
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute, rule, and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issue on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1995), Suspension of
sentence -- Pleas held in abeyance -- Probation -Supervision -- Presentence investigation -- Standards - Confidentiality -- Terms and conditions -Restitution -- Termination, revocation, modification,
or extension -- Hearings -- Electronic monitoring.
Utah R. Crim P. 3, Service and filing of papers.
Utah Const, art. I, sec. 7.
Utah Const, art. I, sec. 12.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
On September 5, 1991, Reedy was charged by Information with
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1953 as amended).

(R. 6.)
2

On October 25, 1991, Reedy

and the state entered into a plea agreement, wherein Reedy pled
guilty to a third degree felony. (R. 24-30.)
The trial court accepted the plea agreement and on May 8,
1992, Reedy was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term
"not to exceed five years."

Thereafter, the trial court stayed

Reedy's sentence and placed him on probation for 18 months.
40-41.)

(R.

As a condition of probation the trial court ordered

Reedy to serve "6 months in [the] Salt Lake County jail (credit
for 90 days served)" and to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00
and restitution in the amount of $4,444.00.

(R. 40-41.)

On June 25, 1993, a bench warrant was issued for nonappearance (R. 42) as was an Order to Show Cause, ordering Reedy
to appear before the trial court on May 15, 1995, to show cause
why probation should not be revoked or modified.

(R. 45-46.)

The Order to Show Cause was delivered to Reedy on May 9, 1995.
(R. 46.)

On June 5, 1995, the trial court revoked Reedy's

probation and ordered him to serve his sentence at the Utah State
Prison.

(R. 60-63.)

Reedy and his defense counsel each filed a

motion to reconsider the probation revocation and imposition of
the prison sentence.

(R. 73-117.)

The motions were denied and

the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("Findings and Conclusions") and a final order in connection
therewith.

(R. 128-139.)

Reedy appeals from the final order.

(R. 140.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 5, 1991, Reedy was arrested and charged by
3

Information with theft, a second degree felony.

(R. 6.)

On

October 25, 1991, Reedy and the state entered into a plea
agreement, whereby Reedy pled guilty to a third degree felony.
(R. 24-30.)

The trial court accepted the plea agreement (id.),

and thereafter sentenced Reedy to an indeterminate sentence at
the Utah State Prison "not to exceed five years."

(R. 40-41.)

The trial court then stayed execution of the sentence and placed
Reedy on probation for "18 months" with "6 months in [the] Salt
Lake County jail (credit for 90 days served)," and imposed a fine
in the amount of $500.00 and restitution in the amount of
$4,444.00 against him.

(R. 40-41, 173-75.)

With respect to the

probation, the trial court stated the following:
The record should reflect that what I'm going to
do at this point, I'm basically going to follow the
recommendations that are contained in the presentence
report. I'm going to sentence and place Mr. Reedy on
probation to the agency of Adult Probation and Parol
for a period of 18 months. The conditions of that
probation will be as follows: First of all, I'm going
to require as a condition of probation that he spend
six months in the Salt Lake County jail. The record
should reflect that I am going to give him credit for
time served, at this point credit for 90 days, Mr.
Brown. If this court receives written certification
from the jail that that 90 day credit ought to be
adjusted upward, I certainly will consider that. But
at this point I'm going to credit him for the 90 days.
He'll have to serve the remaining time as conditions of
probation. The remaining condition will be that he
have no other violations of the law as a term and
condition of the probation.
Additionally, I'm also going to require him to pay
restitution in this matter jointly and severally in the
amount of $4,444. That payment schedule will be set up
by Adult Probation & Parol. Additionally, I'm going to
also require him to pay a fine and surcharge
assessment, total sum of $500. And the record should
reflect the reason why I'm reducing that substantially
from the amount in the presentence report is for the
reason that I'm more concerned at this point with the
4

restitution. That figure seems to be fairly high and
I'm going to place emphasis on that amount as opposed
to the fine and surcharge assessment.
•

*

*

Additionally, as a condition of probation, I'm
going to require that defendant [ ] maintain full time
verifiable employment or education as well as terms and
condition of probation.
(R. 173-74.)
On June 25, 1993, without notice to Reedy's counsel, Adult
Probation & Parole ("AP&P") filed a "Progress/Violation Report"
("Report") and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause
("Affidavit").

(R. 44, 47-48.)

Significantly, AP&P identified

"Ken Browne" as counsel for Reedy, but made no attempt to contact
or serve him with the papers within a reasonable time of filing
the Report and Affidavits with the trial court.

(R. 44.)

The documents sought the entry of a warrant of arrest and
order to show cause why Reedy's probation should not be revoked.
(Id.)

On the face of the Report, no violation of probation was

cited.

The Report stated:

On May 8, 1992, Your Honor placed the defendant on 18
months probation with the following special conditions:
1.

Serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail
(credit for 90 days served);
2.
Pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 which includes
surcharge;
3.
Pay restitution in the amount of $4,444.00;
4.
Participate in and complete any educational and/or
vocational training as directed by the Department
of Adult Probation and Parole; and,
5.
Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
On June 24, 1993, a field home visit was conducted at
the defendant's last residence of record. The
defendant was not at home but his brother explained
that the defendant had gone to California with his
father and had left approximately one-and-half months
ago. The defendant has not obtained a Travel Permit to
leave the State of Utah; and, therefore, should be
5

considered a fugitive from justice. The defendant is
on the BI Telephone Profile and records from that
agency indicated the defendant failed to make his
monthly phone calls for April, May, and June.
(R. 44.)

The initial Affidavit stated that Reedy violated the

terms and conditions of probation as follows:
1.
2.

3.

By having left the State of Utah without prior
written authorization, in violation of condition
number 4 of the defendant's Probation Agreement.
By having failed to pay the $4,444 in restitution
as ordered by the Court and in violation of
special condition number 11.C of the defendant's
Probation Agreement.
By having failed to pay the fine of $500.00 as
ordered by the Court and in violation of special
condition number 11.B of the defendant's Probation
Agreement.

(R. 47-48.)

AP&P failed to submit a copy of the alleged

"Probation Agreement" to the trial court for consideration in
connection with the Affidavit.

Notwithstanding, the trial court

entered the Order to Show Cause on June 25, 1993, ordering Reedy
to appear before the trial court "on the 15 day of May, 1995, at
the hour of 9 a.m. then and there to show cause why the probation
of said defendant should not be revoked or modified by the
Court."

(R. 45-46.)

for Reedy's arrest.

The trial court also issued a bench warrant
(R. 53.)

The Order to Show Cause was the only document served on
Reedy and his attorney, Ken Brown.
(R. 45-46.)

It was served "May 9, 1995."

Nothing in the record reflects that any attempt was

made to serve the Affidavit, the Report, the issued Order to Show
Cause, or the Bench Warrant on Reedy or his counsel prior to that
date.

(See R. 55 (even though the Order to Show Cause states the

trial court served that document on May 9, 1995, the trial court
6

found that as of May 15, 1995, "counsel for the defendant is not
present and has not been served").)

Yet according to the Report

and Affidavit filed on June 25, 1993, AP&P was in contact with
Reedy's brother (R. 44), AP&P knew Reedy was in California with
his father (R. 44), and Ken Brown was identified as Reedy's
counsel of record in the case. (R. 44).
An amended Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause was
filed on May 9, 1995.

It stated Reedy violated the terms and

conditions of probation by failing to "report to Adult
[P]robation and Parole as directed since March 5, 1993, in
violation of condition number 1 of defendant's Probation
Agreement."

(R. 51-52.)

Again, AP&P failed to submit a copy of

the "Probation Agreement" to the trial court for consideration in
connection with the amended Affidavit.

The amended Affidavit

does not reflect that it was served at anytime on Reedy or his
counsel.

(See R. 51-52, 188.)

Notwithstanding, Reedy admitted

he violated the terms of the Probation Agreement as set forth in
the amended Affidavit.

(R. 188-89.) x

In June 1995, the trial court revoked Reedy's probation and
entered Findings and Conclusions in connection therewith. (R.
129-138.)

Upon entry of the Findings and Conclusions, the trial

court committed Reedy to the Utah State Prison for an

1

Reedy left the state because his brother in California died,
leaving three children without a caretaker. Reedy took his twin boys
with him to California to take care of the children and his mother. (R.
190-91.) Reedy returned to Utah with the children and is responsible for
taking care of them and his mother in the Salt Lake area.
7

indeterminate term of zero to five years.

(R. 195.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1, when papers seeking
probation revocation are filed with the trial court, the court is
required to determine whether probable cause exists to enter an
order to show cause why defendant's probation should not be
revoked.
court "shall"

Once the trial court has made that determination, the
provide notice of the filings to the probationer.

That notice initiates revocation proceedings.

In this case, the

trial court delayed providing notice to Reedy and his counsel
concerning the revocation proceedings until after the
probationary period had expired.

Service of the order to show

cause was made on Reedy and his attorney in May 1995, more than
18 months after the probationary period expired.

Thus, the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter.
ARGUMENT
SINCE REEDY WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE AFFIDAVIT,
REPORT AND ORDER PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE
PROBATIONARY PERIOD, THE TRIAL COURT LACKED
JURISDICTION AFTER EXPIRATION OF THAT PERIOD TO
ENTERTAIN THE ISSUES RAISED IN THOSE DOCUMENTS.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1995), probation
may not be modified, extended, or revoked, except as follows:
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or
extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the
probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court
that the probationer has violated the conditions of
probation.
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(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a
hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of
probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging
with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court
that authorized probation shall determine if the
affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a

warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and
an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified,
or extended.
(Emphasis added.) Those provisions are preceded by the following:
(11) . . .(b) The running of the probation period
is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an
order to show cause or warrant by the court.
Compliance with subsections (11) and (12) effectuates a tolling
of the probationary period.
A.
TOLLING OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD IS ACHIEVED
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT SERVES SPECIFIC PAPERS ON THE
PROBATIONER.
In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court determined that probation revocation proceedings
must be properly initiated

before the probation period expires in

order for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the matter.
In Green, the trial court suspended defendant's prison term
and placed him on probation for 18 months with the condition that
he comply with federal, state, and local laws.

After expiration

of the probationary term, AP&P learned that defendant had been
charged with committing state offenses during the probationary
period.

The defendant ultimately was convicted of the offenses,
9

and thereafter, AP&P filed an affidavit seeking revocation of
defendant's already-terminated probationary term.

Seven months

later, the trial court determined defendant was in violation of
his probation.

Green, 757 P.2d at 462-63.

On appeal the state argued the probationary violation was
enough to "toll" the eighteen month probationary term, and that
"there is no time limit for initiating a revocation action."
464.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court found this argument to be absurd.
Defendants would be left in a perpetual state of limbo;
although probation would appear to have been
terminated, usually by entry of an order to that
effect, defendant would actually be subject to a
continued term of fictional supervision. This
indefinite probationary term could theoretically be
revoked many years after the original imposition and
suspension of sentence. Decades could pass and then,
based upon the discovery of a probation violation which
had occurred during the statutory period, a court could
revoke a term of probation thought to have been
terminated long ago. This construction would obviate
the certainty and regularity created by the statute and
ignore the plain meaning of the word "terminate."

Id.

According to Green, the revocation proceedings must be

initiated prior to expiration of the probationary period in order
to toll that period.

If the trial court fails to initiate those

proceedings within the probationary period, it is without
jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
After Green, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court addressed
"which stage in the revocation proceedings must be reached within
the period of probation for the court to retain its authority
over probationers beyond the probation period."

Smith v. Cook,

803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added); State v. Rawlinas, 893
P.2d 1063, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
10

In doing so, the courts

looked to the statute.
As recognized in Rawlinqs, Section 77-18-1 creates an
expectation on behalf of the probationer of notice of revocation
proceedings and hearings.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(b)(ii) ;

Rawlinqs, 893 P.2d at 1067.

It requires the trial court to cause

"a warrant for [] arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order
to show cause why [] probation should not be revoked, modified,
or extended" to be served on the probationer.
18-1(12)(b)(ii).

Utah Code Ann. 77-

The statute does not relieve the trial court of

that obligation if the papers allege the probationer absconded
from the jurisdiction.

Thus, unless the trial court serves the

papers, thereby providing notice to the probationer of the
proceedings, the process has not been properly initiated to allow
the trial court to retain jurisdiction over revocation
proceedings.

Smith, 803 P.2d at 788 (trial court lacked author-

ity to revoke probation after period of probation had expired
where probationer was not served with order to show cause within
probationary period).

If service is not accomplished within the

probationary period, the court lacks the authority to revoke the
probation period because the trial court's discretion to revoke
probation "'must be exercised within the limits imposed by the
legislature.'"

Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (citation omitted).

B.
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ALLOW NOTICE AND
SERVICE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY MAILING THE RELEVANT
PAPERS TO COUNSEL OF RECORD.
Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "all
written motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the
court and served on all other parties."
11

When service is required

to be made on a party represented
shall

be made uvon

the

by an attorney,

attorney,

"the service

unless service upon the party

himself is ordered by the court.

Service upon the attorney or

upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil
actions," including via mail.

Utah R. Crim. P. 3 (1996)

(emphasis added); Utah R. Civ. P. 5 (1996).

With service

pursuant to Rule 3, the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction
does not affect a party or the trial court's ability to serve
papers on the defendant and to provide notice of relevant
proceedings.

"Notice served upon a party's attorney of record is

sufficient to satisfy statutory notice requirements. See Blake v.
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454, 456 (1966)."

State v.

Waastaff, 772 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
It is undisputed that during Reedy's probationary period, he
was represented by Ken Brown.

The record clearly identifies him

as counsel of record, and AP&P disclosed as much in the violation
papers that were filed with the trial court.

(R. 44.)

Pursuant

to Rule 3, the trial court was required to serve papers under
Section 77-18-1(12) on Mr. Brown.

The service should have been

accomplished prior to expiration of Reedy's probationary period
in order for the trial court to properly initiate the revocation
proceedings, and in order for the trial court to retain
jurisdiction over the matter after expiration of the probationary
period.

However, no effort was made by the state, AP&P or the

trial court to send notice during the probationary period either
to Reedy's former address (where his brother was currently
residing) or his counsel of record.
12

(R. 43-55.)

Because the trial court failed to serve the papers as
mandated by Section 77-18-1 and Rule 3, the revocation
proceedings were not properly initiated.

The trial court did not

retain jurisdiction to entertain the matter in May 1995.
C.
THE SERVICE REQUIREMENTS SATISFY DUE PROCESS
CONCERNS.
In this jurisdiction, service is not simply a statutory
mandate; it is a guarantee of fundamental fairness, which is
"embodied in the due process clause of the United States
Constitution entitling probationers to written notice of the
accusations against them."

Smith v. Cookf 803 P.2d 788, 795

(Utah 1990) (footnote omitted). 2

Notice is necessary because

"all parties concerned would be aware of the proceedings ... at
the time the probation terminates.

Probationers could also be

assured that no new proceedings or proceedings under different
grounds could be brought against them once the probation period
has ended."

Id..

"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of
procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d

2

The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution provides,
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . . "
Art. I, sees. 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution
also guarantee fundamental fairness during criminal proceedings. For
purposes of this appeal the analysis under the Utah constitution is not
different from the analysis under the federal constitution.
13

1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted); accord
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); W. & G.
Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 761 (Utah
App.1990). "[A]11 parties are entitled to notice that
a particular issue is being considered by a court and
to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on
that issue before decision." Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743.
A defendant may be denied his or her right to due
process under article I, section 7, of the Utah
Constitution if adequate notice has not been given.
Id.; see also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (notice is "
' [a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process' ") (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94
L.Ed. 865 (1950)). "'"Many cases have held that where
notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of
the nature of the proceedings against him [or her] or
not given sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to
permit preparation, a party is deprived of due
process."'" Plumb, 809 P.2d at 743 (quoting Cornish
Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990) (quoting
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212)); accord W. & G. Co., 802
P.2d at 762.
Sufficient notice is informing a party "of the specific
issues which they must prepare to meet" and giving the
party a "'reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing party and to meet them.'" W. & G. Co.,
802 P.2d at 761 (emphasis added) (citations and
quotation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has set
forth the well-established requirements of adequate
notice:
[N]otice [must be] reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. The notice must be
of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, and it must afford a
reasonable time for those interested to make
their appearance.
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314, 70 S.Ct. at 657).
Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069.
It is well settled that a probationer is entitled to due
process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation
14

seriously deprives a person of his or her liberty.

Gacrnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36
L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990);
State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944).
In this matter, AP&P alleged in the violation papers that
Reedy absconded from the jurisdiction.

That should not justify a

failure to serve his attorney with the papers.

In that instance,

the trial court apparently determined it would forego service of
the papers on Reedy's counsel, thereby effectively preventing
Reedy from responding to the allegations in a timely manner.

At

the very least, service should have been attempted. If the trial
court determined it could not be accomplished, or if Reedy and
his counsel then refused after service of the papers to defend
against the allegations, the trial court would be justified in
retaining jurisdiction of the matter, and due process concerns
would be satisfied.

Where the trial court made no attempt to

comply with the due process concerns and the statutory
requirements found at Section 77-18-1(12) (b) (ii), which were
imposed on the trial court, it could not later assert
jurisdiction over the matter after expiration of the probationary
period.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Reedy respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the final order and declare the revocation
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proceedings null and void since the trial court was without
jurisdiction to revoke Reedy's probation.
SUBMITTED this 3d-tL
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^<^±,„J^.

1996.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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E.NEALGUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLARK A. HARMS, 5713
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
ORDER

Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

Case No. 911901376 FS

ROBERT REEDY,

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on for hearing on Monday, September 18,
1995, for consideration and determination of Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Probation
Revocation, which had been filed herein on or about August 16,1995. The Honorable Glenn K.
Iwasaki, District Judge, presided. Defendant was present, and was represented by Deborah
Kreeck Mendez,. The State was represented by Clark A. Harms, Deputy District Attorney.
The matter was called, and the Court indicated that it had received, reviewed and was
conversant with the Motion of Defendant, as well as the supporting and opposing memoranda
relating thereto. The Court thereafter permitted and heard the arguments of counsel. Being fully
advised and informed in the premises, for good cause shown, the Court, having previously made

ORDER
Case No. 911901376 FS
Page 2

and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following
Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Probation Revocation is denied.

2.

Defendant's probation is revoked, based upon his admitted violations of the terms

and conditions of probation imposed by this Court on May 8,1992.
3.

Defendant's commitment to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate period of

from zero to five years, which was imposed and stayed by this Court on May 8,1992, and which
stay was lifted, and the committment imposed on June 5,1995, is affirmed and will remain the
Order and Judgment of the Court.
DATED this / 7

day of September, 1995.

ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to
Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Attorney for Defendant, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111 on the jvh&y

of September, 1995.

A R £ T C HARMS
Deputy District Attorney

ADDENDUM B

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and
presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the
department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.

(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the Department
of Corrections.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may
supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections
regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the
defendant.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
Department of Corrections.
(6) The Department of Corrections shall make the presentence investigation
report available for review at the court ten days in advance of sentencing and
shall mail or deliver copies to the defendant, defendant's attorney, and

prosecutor ten days in advance of sentencing. Any inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and
Department of Corrections prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge, and a determination of relevance or accuracy
shall be made by the judge on the record. If a party fails to raise an objection
at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the
court, for the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the
court orders supervised probation by the department.
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the
clerk of the court.
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide
notice of the order to the parties.
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.

(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and
prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination
of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding
fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.

(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified private in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 1,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; or
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 3. Service and filing of papers.
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the court
and served on all other parties.
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil actions.
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution by the court, mail to
each party a copy thereof and certify to the court such mailing.

Art. I

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

coNsrmrnoN OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

